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Abstract. In this tutorial, we present an authorization model for dis-
tributed systems that operate with limited internet connectivity. Reliable
internet access remains a luxury for a majority of the world’s population.
Even for those who can afford it, a dependence on internet connectivity
may lead to sub-optimal user experiences. With a focus on decentral-
ized deployment, we present an authorization model that is suitable for
scenarios where devices right next to each other (such as a sensor or
a friend’s phone) should be able to communicate securely in a peer-to-
peer manner. The model has been deployed as part of an open-source
distributed application framework called Vanadium. As part of this tuto-
rial, we survey some of the key ideas and techniques used in distributed
authorization, and explain how they are combined in the design of our
model.
1 Introduction
Authorization is a fundamental problem in computer security that deals with
whether a request to access a resource must be granted. The decision is made
by a reference monitor guarding the resource. Authorization is fairly straightfor-
ward in closed systems where all resources of interest are held on a small set of
devices, and reference monitors have pre-existing relationships with all autho-
rized principals. In these systems, authorizing a request involves identifying the
principal making the request, and then verifying that this identity is allowed by
the resource’s access control policy. The former is called authentication, and the
latter is called access control.
Authorization in distributed systems is significantly more complex as the
resources are spread across a network of devices under different administrative
domains [22]. Moreover, not all devices and principals in the system may know
each other beforehand, making even authentication complicated. For instance,
consider the fairly common scenario of a user Alice trying to play a movie from
her internet video service on her television (TV). It involves the TV authorizing
the request from Alice to play a movie, and the video service authorizing the
request from the TV to access Alice’s account. The video service may recognize
only Alice, and not her TV. The TV must convince the video service that it is
acting on Alice’s behalf.
With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), various physical devices that
we commonly interact with in our daily lives are controllable over the network,
and are thus part of a large distributed system. These devices range from tiny
embedded devices, to wearables, to large home appliances, and automobiles. The
promise of IoT lies in multiple devices interacting with each other to accomplish
complex tasks for the user. For instance, a home security system may interact
with security cameras and locks around the house to ensure that the house is
protected from intruders at all times, and all suspicious activity is logged on the
user’s storage server. Securely accomplishing such tasks involves making several
authorization decisions. Some of the key questions that arise are how do devices
identify each other during any interaction?, how do users authorize devices to
act on their behalf?, how are access control policies defined?
Distributed authorization is a long-standing area of research, and several
mechanisms have been designed for a variety of settings. However, most IoT
devices still rely on rudimentary and fragile mechanisms based on passwords
and unguessable IP addresses [26,19]. Indeed, over the last few months, there
have been several vulnerabilities and attacks reported on various “smart” de-
vices [1,4,2,5]. A study [19] conducted by HP on the security of several existing
IoT devices reported “insufficient authorization” as one of the top security con-
cerns. Besides this, the study found that many devices rely on a service in the
cloud for authorization. We stress that proper authorization is paramount in the
IoT setting as authorization breaches can impact physical security and safety.
At the same time, dependence on internet connectivity can sometimes render
“smart” devices unusable. Imagine the consequences of unauthorized access to
an embedded heart rate monitor, or being unable to unlock the door right in
front of you due to lack of internet access.
This tutorial explores the design of an authorization model for large, open
distributed systems such as IoT. The primary guiding principles behind the de-
sign of the model are decentralized deployment and peer-to-peer communication.
The model does not rely on any special global authorities for brokering interac-
tions between devices that have a network path to each other. The justification
for these principles is manyfold. First, a centralized model assumes all entities
implicitly trust the default global authorities. This assumption fails for the en-
terprise and IoT settings where it is desirable to carve out isolated and fully
autonomous administrative domains for devices. For instance, a user may want
to be the sole authority on all devices in her home. Similarly, an enterprise may
want to maintain full control of its devices with no dependence on any exter-
nal authority. Second, the central nodes in the system become an attractive
target for compromise to attackers. Given the frequent security breaches at well-
reputed organizations, users are justifiably weary of having third-party services
store more personal data than strictly necessary. Besides this, protecting per-
sonal user data from external and internal threats is quite burdensome for the
organizations as well. Finally, a centralized model requires that all devices main-
tain connectivity to external global services, which is infeasible for many IoT
devices, including ones that communicate only over Bluetooth, or ones present
in public spaces such as shopping malls, buses, and trains, where internet access
is unreliable. Moreover, reliable internet access remains a luxury for a major-
ity of the world’s population, where routing most interactions through a cloud
service can be expensive or simply not possible.
The authorization model presented in this tutorial is fully decentralized, and
is based on a distributed public-key infrastructure similar to SDSI [27]. The
model supports peer-to-peer delegation of authority under fine-grained caveats [10].
Access control policies are based on human-readable names, and have support
for negative clauses and group-based checks. This general purpose model is appli-
cable in various distributed system settings, including, peer-to-peer computing
environments, IoT, cloud, and enterprise. The model has been deployed as part of
an open-source application framework called Vanadium [6], and is thus referred
to as the Vanadium authorization model. As part of this tutorial, we survey a
number of key ideas and techniques from previous work on distributed autho-
rization, including SPKI/SDSI [27,18], Macaroons [10], and the vast body of
work on trust management [12]. We explain how these techniques are combined
by the Vanadium authorization model.
Organization. The rest of this tutorial is organized as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the features we desire, and Section 3 surveys key technical ideas involved
in the design of our model. Section 4 describes our model in detail, followed by
an application of our model to a physical lock device in Section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Desired Features
In this section, we describe features we seek from our authorization model. Many
of these features have been considered by prior work on distributed authorization.
We use the term “principal” informally to refer to an entity in our system,
including, users, devices, processes, and objects, and leave the formal definition
to Section 4.
Decentralization. As discussed in the introduction, decentralized deployment
and peer-to-peer communication by default are the central guiding principles
behind this work. The model must not force dependence on special global au-
thorities such as x.509 certification authorities, default identity providers, and
proxies that mediate interactions between principals. Instead, we seek egalitarian
systems where any principal can be an authority for some set of other principals.
For instance, a user Alice may become an authority on the identities and access
controls on all her home devices. The devices may be configured to specifically
trust only Alice’s credentials. In general, devices must be able to securely com-
municate with each other as long as there is a direct communication channel
between them. We seek a model that minimizes interaction with globally ac-
cessible services, and maximizes what can be achieved with direct peer-to-peer
communication.
Mutual authentication and authorization. We require all interactions be-
tween between principals to be mutually authenticated and authorized. The
principal at each end of a communication channel must identify the principal
at the other end (authentication), and verify that it is valid in the context of
the communication (authorization). Mutual authentication is essential for both
ends to audit all access; we discuss the benefit of auditing later in this section.
Mutual authorization is essential whenever the communicating principals are
mutually suspicious. Unidirectional authorization often opens the door to rogue
entities, leading to security and privacy attacks. For example, when Bob tries
to unlock the lock on Alice’s front door, the lock must be convinced that it is
communicating with Bob, and that Bob is authorized to unlock the door. At
the same time, Bob must be convinced that it is indeed sending the request to
Alice’s front door, and not an imposter device that is tracking Bob’s behavior.
Compound identities. We live in a world today where all users and devices
carry multiple identities. For instance, a user may have an identity from social
media sites (e.g., Facebook identity), an identity from her work place, an identity
from the government (e.g., passport, driver’s license), and so on. Similarly, a
device would have an identity from the manufacturer (e.g., Samsung TV model
123), and an identity from the device owner (e.g., Alice’s TV). A principal must
be able to act under one or more identities associated with it, and different
identities may grant different authorizations to the principal. The authorization
model must seamlessly capture this compound nature of a principal’s identity.
Fine-grained delegation. The strength of distributed systems lies in multiple
computing agents coming together to accomplish complex tasks. This is indeed
the promise of IoT. For example, Bob would like to play a movie from his in-
ternet video service on Alice’s TV and speaker system. In order to enable such
interactions, the authorization model must support flexible sharing and delega-
tion.3 Alice must be able to delegate access to her TV to Bob, and Bob must
be able to delegate access to his internet video service to Alice’s TV for playing
a particular movie. The model must also support delegations across multiple
hops. For instance, Bob must be able to easily delegate access to Alice’s TV
to his friend Carol. Moreover, in light of the decentralization requirement, we
would like delegations to work peer-to-peer rather than be mediated by a central
authority.
In practice, delegation of authority is seldom unconditional, and thus the
delegation mechanism must support constraints on the scope of the delegation.
For instance, Bob may want Alice’s TV to have access to his internet video
service only for playing a particular movie, and only while Bob is present in
Alice’s house. The TV must loose access as soon as Bob leaves the house. Alice
may want the same for Bob’s access to her TV.
We emphasize that the delegation mechanism must be flexible and convenient
to use. Inflexibilities or inconveniences in the mechanism not only affect the user
3Some systems choose to distinguish the concepts of “sharing” an “delegation” with
the former being a mechanism for a principal to allow another principal to access an
object while the latter being a mechanism for allowing another principal to act on its
behalf. In this tutorial, we do not make this distinction, and treat “delegation” more
broadly as a mechanism for one principal to delegate some of its authority to another
principal.
experience but are also detrimental to security as they push users to look for
insecure workarounds. For instance, in the absence of a convenient mechanism
to share access to an internet video service, Bob may end up sharing his account
password with the TV, and as a result give away access to all his account data
(e.g., viewing history, purchases) instead of just access to a particular movie.
Auditable access. In a system with delegation, users should be able to audit
the use of delegated access over time. For instance, a user must be able to
determine who has access to her devices and who has exercised that access.
Delegations are ultimately tied to the intention of the human end-user, and
software must acknowledge that it is impossible to codify all possible human
intentions. This is particularly true when users themselves may be unable to
clearly articulate their intentions at the time of delegation. An accurate audit
trail is a requirement to detect mismatches between user intentions and their
codification. For example, Alice might give Charlie access to her home to come
by and walk her dog once a day. Alice’s intent is for Charlie to be a dog walker
but she cannot possibly know apriori what time Charlie will come by in all
future days. Auditing Charlie’s use of the authority granted to her by Alice is
necessary to detect a violation of the contract between the two. Moreover, this
auditing must be fine grained—if Charlie was tricked into running a malicious
application on her phone, Alice must be able to pinpoint the exact application
that was improperly using the authority she granted to Charlie.
Revocation. Users make mistakes, devices get stolen/compromised, and rela-
tionships break. As a result an authorization model must support revocation. For
instance, Alice must be able revoke Dave’s access to all her home devices when
they have a falling out. Similarly, she should be able to revoke all delegations
that she made to her tablet when her tablet gets stolen.
Ease of use. Usability is a key determining factor in the effectiveness of security
systems [30,14]. Systems with complex interfaces and mechanisms often have
degraded security, as users tend to look for insecure workarounds when dealing
with them. Thus we strive to design an authorization model that can be easily
understood and configured by system developers, and lends itself well to simple
and clear user interfaces.
3 Background
Distributed authorization is a very mature field with decades of prior research.
The Vanadium authorization model is a result of combining various known tech-
niques in order to meet the requirements stated in the previous section. In this
section, we provide some background on distributed authorization, and discuss
the key ideas involved in the design of the Vanadium authorization model.
In essence, most authorization mechanisms involve a requester presenting a
set of credentials (possibly obtained from multiple parties) to a reference mon-
itor guarding a resource which then authorizes the request after validating the
credentials [29]. A common paradigm is for the requester to present credentials
that establish its identity, which is then checked against an access control policy
(e.g., an access control list (ACL)) by the reference monitor. Various mechanisms
differ in the type of credentials involved. In mechanisms such as OAuth2 [21],
OpenID [3], Macaroons [10], and many others [25,20], the credentials are essen-
tially tokens constructed using symmetric-key cryptography by an issuer (e.g.,
an identity provider in the case of OAuth2). These mechanisms are simple, ef-
ficient, easy to deploy, and are widely in use (particularly OAuth2) for client
authorization on the Web. The downside is that the credentials can be vali-
dated and interpreted only by the credential issuer. As a result, the credential
issuer must be invoked for validating credentials during each request4. This is
undesirable in our setting.
In contrast, mechanisms based on public-key certificates [32,12,11,27,13,23,9]
do not suffer from this downside. In these mechanisms, principals possess digital
signature public and secret key pairs along with signed certificates binding au-
thorizations to their public key. A principal makes requests by signing statements
using its secret key and presenting one or more of its certificates. These certifi-
cates can be validated and interpreted by any principal as long as it knows the
public key of the certificate issuer. Such a mechanism is used for authenticating
HTTPS [17] servers on the Web.
Certificate-based mechanisms rely on a public-key infrastructure (PKI) for
distributing certificates to various principals. Traditional x509 PKI [28], such as
the one used on the Web, is centralized with a hierarchical network of certifica-
tion authorities responsible for issuing certificates. In light of the downsides of
centralization, several decentralized PKI [27,18,32,11,12] have been proposed in
the literature. A prominent model among these is the simple distributed security
infrastructure (SDSI) [27] of Rivest and Lampson. The SDSI model was subse-
quently merged with the simple public key infrastructure (SPKI) effort [18], and
the resulting model is commonly referred to as SPKI/SDSI. In what follows,
we briefly summarize some of the key ideas in SPKI/SDSI, while referring the
reader to [27,18] for a more comprehensive description.
SPKI/SDSI. This is a decentralized PKI based on the idea of local names.
Each principal in this model is represented by a digital signature public key, and
manages a local name for referring to other principals. For instance, a principal
Alice may use the name friend to refer to her friend Bob’s public key and
doctor to refer to her family doctor Frank’s public key. These bindings are local
to Alice, and other principals may chose to bind different names to these keys.
However, another principal, say Alice’s TV, who names Alice’s public key as
Alicemay refer to Bob’s public key as Alice’s friend. Thus names in different
namespaces can be linked using the ’s operator. Local name to key bindings
are represented by name-definition certificates signed by the issuing principal.
Linked names are thus realized by certificate chains. The model also supports
authorization certificates wherein an issuing principal delegates permissions to
another principal.
4An alternative is for each resource owner to become a credential issuer but that leads
to a proliferation of credentials at the requester’s end.
Access control policies in SPKI/SDSI specify a list of authorized principals
using local names in the owner’s namespace. A request is allowed by the policy
if the requesting principal is directly authorized by the policy or has a dele-
gation (via authorization certificate) from a directly authorized principal. For
instance, Alice’s TV may have an access control policy allowing the local name
Alice’s friend, and therefore Bob (who has the name Alice’s friend in the
TV’s namespace) and any principal delegated by Bob will have access. Autho-
rizing requests involves assembling a chain of certificates (from a repository of
certificates) that proves that the requesting principal satisfies the access control
policy [16]. The responsibility of assembling the right certificate chain may be
placed on the reference monitor or the requester, and various deployments may
differ in this choice. The key idea from SPKI/SDSI used in the Vanadium au-
thorization model is that of delegating access to principals by assigning them
local names, and basing access control policies on these names.
Caveats on delegation. There are several mechanisms in the literature on
restricting the scope of delegations. These range from simple, coarse-grained
mechanisms of adding a purpose and expiration time to delegation certificates,
to complex, fine-grained mechanisms of extending delegation certificates with S-
expressions capturing application-specific permissions [18], or program code [13]
defining how access must be proxied to the resource. Recently, Birgisson et al.,
proposed a mechanism for restricting delegations using caveats [10], which aims
at striking a balance between simplicity and expressiveness.
Caveats are essentially predicates that restrict the context in which the del-
egated credential may be used. They are attached to the credential in a tamper-
proof manner, each time the credential is delegated. Caveats are of two types—
first-party and third-party. First-party caveats are predicates on the context in
which a credential may be used. For e.g., first-party caveats impose restrictions
on the time of request (e.g., only between 6PM to 9PM), the permitted opera-
tion (e.g., only Read requests), the requester’s IP address (e.g., the IP address
must not be blacklisted), etc. These restrictions are validated by the reference
monitor in the context of an incoming request, and the credential is considered
invalid if any caveat present on it is invalid.
Third-party caveats are restrictions wherein the burden of validation is pushed
to a third-party, i.e., neither the party that wields the credential nor the party
that is authorizing it. A credential with a third-party caveat is considered valid
only when accompanied by a discharge (proof of validity) issued by the specific
third party mentioned in the caveat. This discharge must be obtained by the
holder of the credential before using the credential as part of a request. A refer-
ence monitor making authorization decisions simply checks that valid discharges
are provided for all third-party caveats on the credential.
A third-party caveat can be used for implementing revocation checks by
having the discharge service issue discharges only if the credential has not been
revoked. The discharge may be short-lived, and thus the holder of the creden-
tial would be obligated to periodically obtain fresh discharges from the service.
Although this mechanism seems similar to the online certificate status protocol
(OCSP) [24], the key difference is that unlike an OCSP response, fetching a dis-
charge is the responsibility of the principal making the request rather than the
one authorizing it. Other examples of third-party caveats would be restrictions
pointed at a social networking service (e.g., discharged by checking membership
in the “work” circle), or an auditing service (e.g., discharged by adding an entry
to the audit log). Discharges may themselves carry first-party and third-party
caveats thereby making the overall mechanism highly expressive. For instance,
a parental-control caveat on a credential handed to a kid may initially point to
a service on dad’s phone who in some cases may issue a discharge with a third-
party caveat pointed at mom’s phone. While caveats were originally designed in
the context of Macaroons [10], in this work we use them to restrict the scope of
delegation certificates in Vanadium.
4 Vanadium Authorization Model
In this section, we describe the authorization model of the Vanadium frame-
work [6]. Vanadium is a set of tools, libraries, and services for developing secure
distributed applications that can run over a network of devices. At the core of the
framework is a remote procedure call (RPC) system that enables applications
to expose services over the network. The framework offers an interface definition
language (IDL) for defining services, a federated naming system for addressing
them, and an API for discovering accessible services. The authorization model
is responsible for controlling access to RPC services, and ensuring that all RPCs
are end-to-end encrypted, mutually authenticated, and mutually authorized.
Preliminaries. The model makes use of a digital signature scheme (e.g.,
ECDSA P-256). In particular, we assume public and secret key pairs (pk , sk),
and algorithms sign and verify for signing messages and verifying signatures
respectively. sign(sk ,msg) uses a secret key sk to produce a signature over
a message msg, and verify(pk ,msg, sig) verifies a signature sig over a mes-
sage msg using a public key pk . For any public and secret key pairs pk , sk ,
∀msg : verify(pk ,msg , sign(sk ,msg)) holds. We also assume a cryptographically
secure hash function (e.g., SHA256), denoted by hash. For convenience, we as-
sume that hash takes an arbitrary number of arguments of arbitrary type, and
internally encodes all arguments into a byte array using some lossless encoding
technique.
4.1 Principals and Blessings
A principal is any entity that can interact in the Vanadium framework. Specifi-
cally, processes, applications, and services that include a Vanadium runtime are
all principals. Each principal is associated with a public and secret key pair,
with the secret key never being shared over the network. Each principal has one
or more hierarchical human-readable names associated with it called blessings.
For instance, a television set (TV) owned by a user Alice5 may have a blessing
Alice / TV. Principals can have multiple blessings, and thus the same TV may
also have a blessing PopularCorp / TV123 from its manufacturer.
Principals are authenticated and authorized during requests based on the
blessing names bound to them. The public key of the principal does not matter
as long as the principal can prove that it has a blessing name satisfying the
other end’s access control policy. We believe that this choice makes it easier and
more natural for users and system administrators to define access control policies
and inspect audit trails as they have to reason only in terms of human-readable
names. Concretely, a blessing is represented via a chain of certificates. The formal
n ::= ordinary names not containing / names
C ::= c〈n, pk , clist , sig〉 certificates
B ::= C blessings
| B:C
clist ::= empty list of caveats
| clist:c
c ::= fc | tc caveats
fc ::= timeCaveat first-party caveats
| targetCaveat
| . . .
tc ::= t〈nonce, pk , fc, loc〉 third-party caveats
d ::= d〈clist , sig〉 discharges
Fig. 1. Certificates, Blessings and Caveats
definition of certificates and blessings is given in Figure 1. We use 〈. . .〉 to define
tuples, colon as a binary operator for forming lists, and empty for the empty
list. n ranges over ordinary names not containing / . Certificates, denoted by
C , contain exactly four fields—a name, a public key, a (possibly empty) list of
caveats, and a digital signature. We discuss the definition of caveats a bit later;
for now they can be thought of as restrictions (e.g., expiration time) on the
validity of the certificate. We use the dot notation to refer to fields of a tuple,
and thus C .n is the name of a certificate C . Notice that our certificate format
is much simpler in contrast to x509 certificates [28].
Blessings (denoted by B) are non-empty lists of certificates with each cer-
tificate capturing a component of the blessing name. The list of certificates is
meant to form a chain such that signature of each certificate except the first one
can be verified using the public key of the previous certificate. The first certifi-
cate is self-signed, that is, its signature can be verified by its own public key.
The public key listed in the final certificate is the public key of the principal to
which the blessing is bound. This public key is denoted by pk(B) for a blessing
5For ease of discussion, we refer to users and devices as principals; strictly speaking,
we are referring to processes controlled by them.
B . The name of a blessing is obtained by concatenating all names appearing in
the blessing’s certificate chain using / . This name is denoted by nm(B).
As an example, the blessing PopularCorp / TV123 is bound to the television’s
public key pkTV by a chain of two certificates—(1) a certificate with name
PopularCorp and public key pkPopularCorp, signed by skPopularCorp, and (2)
a certificate with name TV123 and public key pkTV , signed by skPopularCorp.
The validity of the certificate chain of a blessing B is defined by the predicate
IsValidChain(B).
IsValidChain(B) ::=
case B of
C : verify(C .pk , hash(C .n,C .pk ,C .clist),C .sig)
| B:C : IsValidChain(B) ∧ verify(pk(B), hash(B ,C .n,C .pk ,C .clist),C .sig)
The signature in each certificate of the chain is not just over the certificate’s
contents but also the chain leading up to the certificate. This means that each
certificate is cryptographically integrated into the blessing, and cannot be ex-
tracted and used in another blessing. This property does not hold for SPKI/SDSI
and many other certificate-based systems, where certificates can be chained to-
gether in arbitrary ways. As a result, Vanadium does not face the certificate
chain discovery problem [16] that involves assembling the right chain of certifi-
cates (from a repository) to prove that certain credentials are associated with a
public key. A Vanadium blessing is a tightly bound certificate chain containing
all the certificates required to prove that a certain name is bound to a public
key.
4.2 Delegation and Caveats
Blessings can be delegated from one principal to another by extending them with
additional names. For instance, Alice may extend her blessing Alice to her TV as
Alice / TV. The TV may in turn extend this blessing to the Youtube application
running on it as Alice / TV / Youtube. Since principals possess authority by
virtue of their blessing names, delegating a blessing amounts to delegation of
authority. For instance, delegation of the blessing Alice / TV allows the TV to
access all resources protected by an ACL of the form Allow Alice / TV.
Concretely, a delegation is carried out by the operation Bless(pk , sk ,B , n, clist)
which takes the public key pkd of the delegate, the secret key sk of the delegator,
the blessing B that must be extended, the name n used for the extension, and
the list of caveats clist on the delegation. It extends the blessing’s certificate
chain with a certificate containing name n, public key pkd, list of caveats clist ,
and signed by the secret key sk .
Bless(pkd, sk ,B , n, clist) ::= B:c〈n, pkd, clist , sign(sk , hash(B , n, pk , clist))〉
It is easy to see that if the blessing B is valid, and the secret key sk corre-
sponds to the public key pk(B), then the blessing Bless(pkd, sk ,B , n, clist) is
valid. Each blessing delegation involves the blesser choosing an extension (e.g.,
TV) for the blessing. The extension may itself have multiple components (e.g.,
home / bedroom / TV), and a blesser may choose the same or a different exten-
sion across multiple delegations. The role of the extension is to namespace the
delegation, similar to local names in SDSI [27].
The role of the caveat list (clist) supplied to the Bless operation is to restrict
the conditions under which the resulting blessing can be used. For example, Alice
can bless her TV as Alice / TV but with the caveats that the blessing can be
used only between 6PM and 9PM, and only to make requests to her video service
(and not her bank!). Thus, the resulting blessing makes the assertion:
The name Alice:TV is bound to pkTV
as long as the TIME is between 6PM and 9PM, and
as long as target of the request matches SomeCorp / VideoService
When the TV uses this blessing to make a request to the video service, the
service will grant the request only if the current time is within the permitted
range, and its own blessing name matches SomeCorp / VideoService.
The caveats in the above example are all first-party caveats as they are
validated by the reference monitor at the target service when the blessing is
presented during a request. As discussed in Section 3 and [10], first-party caveats
are validated in the context of an incoming request based on information such as
the time of request, the blessing presented, the method invoked, etc. We use C
to denote request contexts, and assume a function IsValidFCav(fc, C) that checks
if a first-party caveat fc is valid in the context C.
While the Vanadium framework implements IsValidFCav on some standard
first-party caveats (e.g., expiry, method and peer restriction), services may also
define their own first-party caveats. For instance, a video streaming service may
define a “PG-13” caveat so that blessings carrying this caveat would be autho-
rized to stream only PG-13 movies.
4.3 Third-Party Caveats
Vanadium blessings may also carry third-party caveats [10] wherein the burden
of validating the caveat is pushed to a third-party. For example, Alice can bless
Bob as Alice / Houseguest / Bob but with the caveat that the blessing is valid
only if Bob is within 20 feet of Alice as determined by a proximity service running
on Alice’s phone (third-party). Before making a request with this blessing, Bob
must obtain a discharge (proof) from the proximity service on Alice’s phone.
This discharge must be sent along with the blessing in a request. Thus, the
blessing makes the assertion:
The name Alice / Houseguest / Bob is bound to pkBob
as long as a proximity service on Alice’s phone issues a discharge after
validating that Bob is “within 20 feet” of it.
The structure of a third-party caveat and discharge is defined in Figure 1. Every
third-party caveat includes a nonce (for uniqueness), a public key controlled by
the third-party service, a first-party caveat specifying the check that must carried
out before issuing the discharge, and the location of the third-party service. A
discharge contains a signature and possibly additional caveats. It is considered
valid if its signature can be verified by the public key listed in the third-party
caveat, and any additional caveats listed on it are valid.
The operation MintDischarge(sk tp, tc, clist , C) uses a secret key sk tp (owned
by the third-party) to produce a discharge for a third-party caveat tc if the
check specified in tc is valid in the context C. The returned discharge contains
the provided list of caveats clist .
MintDischarge(sk tp, tc, clist , C) ::=
case IsValidFCav(tc.fc, C) of
true : error
| false : d〈clist , sign(sk tp , hash(tc, clist))〉
The purpose of the additional caveats on the discharge is to limit its validity.
For instance, in the proximity caveat example, Alice’s phone may issue a dis-
charge that expires in 5 minutes thereby requiring Bob to fetch a new discharge
periodically. This ensures that Bob cannot cheat by fetching a discharge when
near Alice’s phone, and then using it later from a different location.
4.4 Blessing Roots
Since blessing names are the basis of authorization, it is important for them to
be unforgeable. Simply verifying the signatures in a certificate chain does not
protect against forgery because the first certificate in the chain is self-signed, and
thus can be constructed by any principal. For instance, an attacker with public
and secret keys pka, ska can bind the name Alice to her public key using the
blessing c〈Alice, pka, empty, sign(ska, hash(Alice, pka, empty))〉. She may then
extend this blessing with any extension of her choosing using the Bless operation.
In order to defend against such forgery, all Vanadium principals have a set
of recognized roots. The root of a blessing is the public key and name of the
first certificate in the blessing’s certificate chain. A blessing is recognized by
a principal only if the blessing’s root is recognized. For instance, all of Alice’s
devices may recognize her public key pkAlice and name Alice as a root. Any
blessing prefixed with Alice would be recognized only if it has pkAlice as the root
public key. Similarly all devices manufactured by PopularCorp may recognize the
public key pkPopularCorp and name PopularCorp as a root. Devices from another
manufacturer may not recognize this root, and would simply discard blessings
from PopularCorp.
We use the term identity provider for a principal that acts as a blessing root
and hands blessings to other principals. For instance, both Alice and Popular-
Corp would be considered as identity providers by Alice’s TV. Any principal
can become an identity provider. In general, we anticipate well-known compa-
nies, schools, and public agencies to become identity providers, and different
principals may recognize different subsets of these.
4.5 Authentication and Authorization
Client and servers in a remote procedure call (RPC) authenticate each other by
presenting blessings bound to their public keys. The Vanadium authentication
protocol [7] is based on the well-known SIGMA-I protocol [15]. It ensures that
each end learns the other end’s blessing, and is convinced that the other end
possesses the corresponding secret key. At the end of the protocol, an encrypted
channel (based on a shared key) is established between the client and server for
further communication. Since the protocol is fairly standard, we do not discuss
it here and refer the reader to [7] for a detailed description.
Once authentication completes, each end checks that the other end’s blessing
is authorized for the RPC. Authorization is mutual. For example, Alice (client)
may invoke a method on her TV (server) only if the TV presents a blessing
matching Alice / TV, and the TV may authorize Alice’s request only if she
presents a blessing prefixed with Alice. Authorization checks involve two key
steps—(1) validating the blessing presented by the other end, followed by (2)
matching the blessing name against an access control policy.
A blessing is always validated in the context of a given request. Blessing
validation involves —(1) verifying the signatures on the blessing’s certificate
chain, (2) verifying that the blessing root is recognized, and (3) validating all
caveats on the blessing in the context of the request.
IsValidBlessing(B ,R, C), defined below, determines if a blessing B is valid for
a given request context C and a set of recognized rootsR. The context is assumed
to contain all parameters of the request, including any discharges sent by the
other end. Specifically, dis(C) denotes the discharges contained in the context
C, root(B) is the root of the blessing B and cavs(B) is the set of all caveats
appearing on certificates of the blessing B . A first-party caveat is validated by
invoking the function IsValidFCav, and a third-party caveat is validated by finding
a matching discharge in the request context, i.e., a discharge whose signature can
be verified using the public key specified in the third-party caveat. Additionally,
any caveats listed on the discharge are also (recursively) validated.
IsValidBlessing(B ,R, C) ::=
IsValidChain(B) ∧ IsRecognized(B ,R) ∧ IsValidCavs(cavs(B), C)
IsRecognized(B ,R) ::= ∃r ∈ R : root(B) = r
IsValidCavs(clist , C) ::=
∀c ∈ clist :
case c of
fc : IsValidFCav(fc, C)
| tc : ∃d ∈ dis(C) :
verify(tc.pk , hash(tc, d .clist), d .sig)) ∧ IsValidCavs(d .clist , C)
Once the remote end’s blessing is validated, the name of the blessing is
checked against an access control policy. Access is granted only if the check
is successful. We discuss the structure of these policies next.
4.6 Access Control Policies
The syntax and semantics of access control policies in Vanadium has been defined
rigorously in [8]. We give a brief overview of the design in this subsection. Policies
in Vanadium are specified using access control lists (ACLs) that resolve to the set
of permitted blessing names. In order to allow policies to be short and simple,
Vanadium allows ACLs to indirect through groups. For example, Alice may
create a group AliceFriendsG containing the blessing names of all her friends
and add it to all relevant ACLs. This saves her from enumerating the list of
blessing names of family members within each ACL, and also provides a central
place to manage multiple policies. Furthermore, group definitions may be nested.
For instance, the definition of the group AliceFriendsG may contain the group
DaveFriendsG containing the friends of Alice’s flatmate Dave. Typically, the
definition of a group would be held at a remote server, which would be contacted
during ACL resolution. The ACL resolver may cache information about groups
in order to combat unreliable network connectivity and avoid expensive network
roundtrips.
bn ::= n blessing names
| n / bn
p ::= n blessing patterns
| g
| n / p
| g / p
P ::= empty list of blessing patterns
| P:p
A ::= Allow P Deny P ACL
Fig. 2. Access control policies
ACLs may also contain blessing names where one of the components is a
group name. Such names are called blessing patterns, and are meant to capture a
derived set of blessing names. For example, the pattern AliceFriendsG / Phone
defines the set of blessing names of phones of Alice’s friends. In particular, if
the group AliceFriendsG contains the blessing name Bob, then the pattern
AliceFriendsG / Phone would be matched by the blessing name Bob / Phone.
Definitions. The formal definition of blessing patterns and ACLs is given in
Figure 2. As before, n ranges over ordinary names not including / . g ranges
over group names (i.e., name with the subscript “G”), and bn ranges over bless-
ing names. A blessing pattern is a non-empty sequence of ordinary names or
group names separated by / . An ACL is a pair of Allow and Deny clauses, each
containing a list of blessing patterns.6 Deny clauses make it convenient to encode
6The model described in [8] is more general and allows multiple Allow and Deny clauses
in ACLs.
blacklists. For instance, the ACL Allow AliceDevicesG Deny AliceWorkDevicesG
allows access to all of Alice’s devices except her work devices.
Group definitions are of the form g =def P , and thus equate a group name
with a list of blessing patterns. For example, the group AliceFriendsG may have
a definition of the form
AliceFriendsG =def Bob, Carol, DaveFriendsG
A given blessing name satisfies an ACL if there is at least one blessing pattern in
the Allow clause that is matched by the blessing name, and no blessing pattern
in the Deny clause is matched by the blessing name. For example, when Bob is
in the group AliceFriendsG, the ACL Allow AliceFriendsG will permit access
with the blessing name Bob but the ACL Allow AliceFriendsG Deny Bob will
deny it. The default is to deny access, so for example the ACL Allow Bob will
deny access to Carol.
The semantics of ACL checks makes use of the prefix relation on blessing
names. Given two blessing names bn1 and bn2, we write bn1  bn2 if the sequence
of names in bn1 (separated by / ) is a prefix of the sequence of names in bn2,
for e.g., Alice  Alice / TV holds but Ali  Alice / TV does not.
In order to formalize the ACL checking procedure, we first define a function
Meaningρ that maps a blessing pattern to a set of blessing names. It is parametric
on a semantics of group names, which is a function ρ that maps a group name
to a set of members of the group. We discuss how ρ is obtained later.
Meaningρ(p) ::=
case p of
n : {n}
| g : ρ(g)
| n / p : {n / s | s ∈ Meaningρ(p)}
| g / p : {s / s ′ | s ∈ Meaningρ(g), s
′ ∈ Meaningρ(p)}
Meaningρ can be naturally extended to a list of blessing patterns by defining it
as the union of the sets obtained by applying Meaningρ to each element of the
list, with Meaningρ(empty) defined as ∅. Using the function Meaningρ, we define
the function IsAuthorized(bn ,A) that decides whether a given blessing name bn
(seen during a request) satisfies an ACL A.
IsAuthorized(bn ,A) ::=
case A of
Allow PA Deny PD : (∃bn
′ ∈ Meaningρ(PA).bn
′  bn)
∧(¬∃bn ′ ∈ Meaningρ(PD ).bn
′  bn)
The function checks that the blessing name bn matches an allowed blessing
pattern and does not match any denied blessing pattern. Matching is defined
using prefixes (instead of exact equality) for both allowed and denied clauses;
the reasons however are different.
For Allow clauses, the use of the relation  is a matter of convenience.
We believe that often when a service grant access to a principal (e.g., with
blessing name Alice) it may be fine if the access is exercised by delegates of the
principal (e.g., with blessing name Alice/Phone). Thus a pattern in an Allow
clause is considered matched as long as some prefix of the provided blessing name
matches it. Alternatively, services that want to force exact matching for allowed
patterns—perhaps to prevent the granted access from naturally flowing over to
delegates—may use the special reserved name eob at the end of the pattern. For
e.g., the pattern Allow Alice / eob is matched only by the blessing name Alice.
For Deny clauses, ensuring that no prefix of the blessing name matches a
denied pattern is crucial for security. A principal with blessing name bn can
always extend it (using the Bless operation) and bind it to itself. Thus, from a
security perspective it is important that if bn is denied access, then all extensions
of bn are also denied access.
Semantics of groups (ρ). We now discuss how the map ρ from group names to
members of the group is defined. In Vanadium, groups may also be distributed,
in that, different group definitions may be held at different servers. Given this,
defining the map ρ becomes complicated for several reasons. Firstly, due to
network partitions some group servers may be unreachable during ACL checking
and thus their definitions may be unavailable. The definition of a group may
depend on other groups, and there may be no overseeing authority ensuring
absence of dependency cycles. Finally, group server checks need to be secure and
private. For instance, group servers under different administrative domains may
be unwilling to reveal their complete membership lists to each other, and may
offer only an interface for membership lookups. We refer the reader to [8] for
a complete treatment of how these issues are tackled, and explain only the key
ideas below.
When group servers are unreachable during ACL checking, we conservatively
approximate the definition of ρ for those groups. The approximation depends on
whether the group is being resolved in the context of an Allow clause or a
Deny clause. While matching an allowed pattern, unreachable groups are under-
approximated by the empty set. On the other hand, while matching a denied
pattern, unreachable groups are over-approximated by the set of all blessings.
Thus effectively we define two maps ρ⇓ and ρ⇑—the map ρ⇓ is used while defining
Meaningρ for allowed patterns, and the map ρ⇑ is used while defining Meaningρ
for denied patterns. The maps ρ⇓ and ρ⇑ coincide when all group definitions are
available.
ρ⇓ and ρ⇑ can be constructed by considering the list of available group defi-
nitions as a set of productions inducing a formal language. Ordinary names and
/ are terminals, and group names are non-terminals. For instance, the group
definition
g1 =def Alice / Phone, g2 / Phone
can be viewed as two productions
g1 → Alice / Phone
g1 → g2 / Phone
For ρ⇓, no production is associated with a group name whose definition is un-
available. On the other hand for ρ⇑, such group names are associated with pro-
ductions inducing the set of all blessings. Once the set of productions are defined,
for any group name g, ρ⇓(g) and ρ⇑(g) are defined as the set of blessing names
generated from g by the corresponding set of productions.
While constructing ρ⇓ and ρ⇑ in the aforesaid manner is infeasible in practice
as it requires knowledge of all the group definitions, the key observation here is
that checking group membership can be reduced to checking membership in
an induced formal language. In [8], this observation and techniques from top-
down parsing are used to develop a distributed algorithm for checking whether
a blessing name belongs to a group.
4.7 Life of an RPC
We now explain how the various parts of the authorization model come together
during the course of an RPC. Consider Alice’s house guest Bob who wants
to invoke a method on Alice’s TV. Suppose Bob has the blessing BBob with
name Alice / Houseguest / Bob, and the TV has the blessing BTV with name
Alice / TV. Additionally, suppose that Bob’s blessing has a third-party caveat to
a proximity service running on Alice’s phone. Bob has the access control policy
Allow Alice / TV that allows only Alice’s TV, and the TV has the access control
policy Allow Alice:Alice / Houseguest that allows only Alice and her house
guests. In what follows, we describe the steps involved in the RPC from Bob’s
phone to Alice’s TV. We focus on the authentication and access-control aspects,
and do not discuss how various network connections are established.
– Bob uses the Vanadium authentication protocol to initiate a connection to
Alice’s TV.
– As part of the exchange, the TV first sends its blessing BTV to Bob. Bob
invokes IsValidBlessing(BTV ,RBob, CBob) to verify that the blessing BTV is
valid for the current context from Bob’s perspective and the set of blessing
roots recognized by Bob (RBob). If this step succeeds, then Bob verifies
that the name of the blessing (Alice / TV) satisfies his access control policy
(Allow Alice / TV). The connection is aborted if any of these checks fail.
– After authorizing the TV’s blessing, Bob selects his blessing BBob (from
Alice) to present to the TV. Since the blessing carries a third-party caveat,
Bob first connects to the third-party service listed on the caveat to obtain a
discharge. The service performs the necessary checks, and if those succeed,
it issues a discharge to Bob. Bob (recursively) performs the above procedure
for any third-party caveats on the discharge, and once all discharges have
been obtained, he presents all of them with the blessing BBob to the TV.
– The TV invokes IsValidBlessing(BBob,RTV , CTV ) to verify that the blessing
BBob is valid for the current context from the TV’s perpspective (CTV ) and
the set of blessing roots recognized by the TV (RTV ). If this step succeeds,
the TV verifies that the name of the blessing (Alice / Houseguest / Bob)
satisfies its access control policy (Allow Alice:Alice / Houseguest). The
connection is aborted if any of these checks fail.
– After authorization succeeds at the TV’s end, the protocol is complete and
an encrypted channel is established between Bob and the TV. Application
data pertaining to the RPC is then exchanged on this channel.
4.8 Practical Considerations
We now discuss some considerations involved in deploying the authorization
model in practice.
Managing blessings. Authorization in Vanadium is based on blessings. A
principal may acquire multiple blessings over time, each providing access to
some set of services under some contextual restrictions. Consequently, managing
these blessings may become quite onerous. The first problem is storing all these
blessings while keeping track of the meta-data about where they were obtained
from and under what constraints. Another problem is selecting which blessing to
present when authenticating to a peer. While presenting all blessings and letting
the peer choose the relevant one is convenient, it has the downside of leaking
sensitive information, for e.g., a blessing may reveal that Bob is a house guest
of Alice. Instead, Vanadium provides a means to selectively share blessings with
appropriate peers. Blessing are stored by Vanadium principals using a mechanism
similar to cookie jars in Web browsers. All blessings are stored with a blessing
pattern identifying the peer to whom they should be presented. This pattern may
be set based on information provided by the blessing granter. For example, Bob
can add the blessing Alice / Houseguest / Bob with the peer pattern Alice.
Thus, Bob will present this blessing only when communicating with services
that have a blessing name matching this pattern. Any other service that Bob
communicates with will not know that he has this blessing from Alice.
Blessing vs. Adding to an ACL. The careful reader may have noticed that
Vanadium offers two mechanisms for granting access to a resource. For instance,
consider Alice’s TV with an ACL Allow Alice which means all principals with
the blessing name Alice or an extension of it have access. Alice can grant access
to her TV to another principal by either extending her Alice blessing to the
other principal or by adding the other principal’s blessing name to the ACL. The
question then is how does one decide which method is appropriate in a given use-
case. Granting a blessing is akin to handing out a capability, and thus in a way
this question is that of deciding between granting a capability versus modifying
an ACL. We recommend the following approach for making the choice.
The constraints on the access being delegated must be taken into considera-
tion. If the access is meant to be long-lived and unconstrained then modifying
the ACL is preferable as it allows the service administrator to audit and revoke
access at any time. For instance, Alice may share access to her TV with her
flatmate Dave by adding the pattern Dave to the TV’s ACL. Later when Alice
moves out, she can revoke Dave’s access by removing this pattern. On the other
hand, when the access is constrained then blessing with caveats is a more ap-
propriate choice. For instance, Alice may delegate temporary access to her TV
to her house guest Bob by blessing him under a short-lived time caveat.
The choice of how access is granted also affects the subsequent auditability
of the delegated access. For instance, when Dave accesses Alice’ TV he would
use his own blessing (assuming Alice’s TV trusts Dave as a blessing root) and
his access would be recorded as Dave. However, when Bob accesses the TV he
would use his blessing from Alice, and thus his access would be recorded as
Alice / Houseguest / Bob. Finally, we note that the option to change an ACL
may not always be available. When Bob wants to grant access to Alice’s TV to
his friend Carol, extending his blessing to Carol may be his only option as he
may not have the authority to modify the TV’s ACL.
Revocation. We now discuss mechanisms for revoking access. Revocation is
easy when access is granted by adding to an ACL or a group, as it amounts to
simply removing the added entry. It is more challenging when access is granted
via blessing. One approach is to always constrain blessings with short-lived time
caveats, thereby invalidating them automatically after a certain time. Principals
would then have to periodically reach out to their blessing granters for a fresh
blessing. This idea is similar to “reconfirmation” in SDSI [27]. Using a third-
party caveat pointed at a revocation service offers a more systematic way of
realizing this idea. The revocation service would issue a short-lived discharge for
the caveat only if the blessing has not been revoked.
While such third-party caveats elegantly encode revocation restrictions, they
suffer from the downside of requiring blessing holders to periodically connect to
a revocation service. Specifically, they introduce a trade-off between how swiftly
a blessing may be revoked, and how long things may operate when disconnected.
This trade-off may be ameliorated to some extent if devices can recognize when
they are offline and use different revocation timeouts in that case. Furthermore,
in the home setting, a discharge service may be run on a WiFi access point,
thereby requiring devices to maintain connectivity only to the local WiFi net-
work.
5 Application: Physical Lock
In this section, we explain how the Vanadium authorization model may be ap-
plied to a physical lock. The application highlights the flexibility and decen-
tralization aspects of the model. A network controlled lock is a common device
found in many modern homes today. It allows a user to lock and unlock a door
from their phone, and share access to it with visitors. Today, there are a number
of manufacturers building locks for homes, garages, factory floors etc.
The authorization model for most existing products involves a global ser-
vice service in the cloud, often controlled by the lock manufacturer, that is an
authority on all credentials used to access the lock. Typically, the service must
be accessed during setup and whenever access is delegated. As discussed in Sec-
tion 2, this is undesirable as communicating with global services requires internet
access, which may not be perfectly reliable. It can be quite frustrating for a user
to be unable to share access to a lock due to lack of internet connectivity at the
time sharing is initiated. Furthermore, compromising the manufacturer owned
service may allow attacker to unlock all locks managed by the manufacturer.
In what follows, we present an authorization model for locks that is fully de-
centralized, and does not depend on access to an external service or identity
provider.
Overview. The key idea is to have the lock be its own identity provider.
When the lock is set up by its owner, it creates a self-signed blessing for itself,
and extends this blessing to the owner. The blessing granted to the owner is
effectively the key to the lock. All subsequent access to the lock is restricted to
clients that can wield this blessing or extensions of it. Delegation of access is
simply carried out by extending the key blessing.
5.1 Authorization Details
Consider a user Alice who just bought a brand new lock for the front door of her
house. We walk through the steps of setting up identity and access control for
the lock. We assume that Alice is interacting with the lock using another device,
say her phone.
Claiming a new lock. We assume that an out-of-box lock device comes with a
pre-installed public and secret key pair, and a blessing from its manufacturer of
the form <manufacturer> / <serial no>. The first step in setting up the lock
is for Alice to name the lock and obtain a blessing for subsequently interacting
with it. This is accomplished by invoking the Claim method on the lock that
returns a blessing bound to the invoker’s (Alice’s) public key.
The invocation is through a Vanadium remote procedure call. The invoker
authorizes the lock by verifying that it presents a blessing from the manufacturer
with the expected serial number. An unconfigured lock authorizes any principal
to invoke the Claim method on it, after which it considers the setup process
complete and no longer allows invocation of that method.
After the Claim invocation is authorized, the lock creates a self-signed bless-
ing with a name provided by the caller. This blessing is presented by the lock
to authenticate to clients during all subsequent invocations. The lock then acts
as an identity provider and extends this blessing to the invoker’s public key
(learned during authentication). This granted blessing is called the key blessing
of the lock. The invoker saves this blessing for subsequent interactions with the
lock and also recognizes its root as an identity provider. For instance, Alice may
claim the lock on her front door with the name AliceFrontDoor. The lock will
subsequently authenticate to others as AliceFrontDoor, and would grant the
blessing AliceFrontDoor / Key to Alice (here Key is the blessing extension used
by the lock).
Locking and unlocking. Once a lock has been claimed, the Claim method
is disabled and the lock instead exposes the Lock and Unlock methods. The
methods are protected by an ACL that allows access only to clients that wield
a blessing from the lock’s identity provider. In the above example, the ACL
would be Allow AliceFrontDoor, which would be matched by the blessing
AliceFrontDoor / Key.
Delegating access. Any extension of the key blessing also matches the ACL
for the lock’s methods, and thus access to the lock can be delegated by extending
this blessing. As usual, caveats can be added to the extension to restrict its scope.
For instance, Alice can extend her blessing AliceFrontDoor / Key to her house
cleaner as AliceFrontDoor / Key / Cleaner under a time caveat that is valid
only on Mondays between 8AM to 10AM.
Auditing access. The lock can keep track of the blessings used to access it,
even ones that have invalid caveats. Thus, Alice can inspect the log on the lock
for auditing access attempts made by her house cleaner. In particular, Alice can
detect if the cleaner tried to access the lock outside of the agreed upon time
(8AM to 10AM on Mondays) or if there is access by someone who has received
a delegated blessing from the cleaner.
5.2 Discussion
We highlight three distinguishing aspects of the authorization model presented
in this section.
Decentralized. Each lock is an authority on the secrets and credentials that
can be used to access it. No external entity, including the lock manufacturer, can
mint credentials to access a claimed lock device. The credentials for accessing
one lock are completely independent from those for accessing another. Thus,
attackers have no single point of attack to unlock multiple instances.
No internet connectivity required. The authorization model does not re-
quire the lock or the device interacting with it to have internet access at any
point, including during setup. The model does not rely on any third-party service
or identity provider.
Audited. The lock can keep track of when it was accessed, by whom (repre-
sented by the blessings). Since blessings inherently capture a delegation trail,
the access log also conveys how the invoker obtained access.
Having highlighted the above advantages, we note that decentralization comes
at a cost. For instance, the lack of an authoritative source in the cloud makes
it hard to recover from loss or theft of blessings and secret keys. Furthermore,
users are responsible for managing multiple blessings and keeping track of var-
ious delegations they make. We believe that carefully designed user-interfaces
and appropriate reset modes for the lock device can help address some of these
concerns.
6 Conclusion
This tutorial presents the authorization model of the Vanadium framework [6].
In this model, each principal has a digital signature public and secret key pair,
and a set of hierarchical human-readable names bound to its public key via
certificate chains called blessings. All authorizations associated with a principal
are based on its blessing names. In particular, a principal makes a request to
a service by presenting one of its blessings (using the Vanadium authentication
protocol [7]), and the request is authorized if the blessing name satisfies the
service’s access control policy.
A notable feature of the model is its support for decentralization and fine-
grained delegation. The model does not require the existence of special identity
providers that are trusted by all principals by default. Instead, any principal
may choose to become an identity provider and create blessings for itself and
other principals. Each principal has a choice over which other principals it rec-
ognizes as identity providers. Only blessings from recognized identity providers
are considered valid. In practice, we anticipate that there will be a small set of
large-scale identity providers that most people will commonly use in interactions
with the wider world.
Principals can delegate access by extending one or more of their blessings
to other principals. The scope of delegations can be constrained very finely by
adding caveats [10] to the delegated blessing. In particular, blessings support
third-party caveats which allow predicating delegations on consent by specific
third-parties. Such caveats elegantly support revocation, proximity-based restric-
tions, and audit requirements.
Access control policies in Vanadium may indirect through groups whose def-
inition may be distributed across multiple servers, possibly under different ad-
ministrative domains. While several access control mechanisms support groups,
a distinguishing aspect of our design is using groups to construct compound
names. For instance, the pattern AliceFriendsG / Phone, with AliceFriendsG
being a group of blessing names of Alice’s friends, defines the set of blessing
names of phones of Alice’s friends. Such compound names coupled with negative
clauses in ACLs make the problem of checking group membership fairly complex,
especially when the group server may be unreachable. The Vanadium authoriza-
tion model mitigates some of the difficulties by making simplifying choices. For
instance, group definitions cannot contain negative clauses, and ACLs cannot be
reused for defining groups or other ACLs. This tutorial provides a brief overview
of our solution, with a more comprehensive description available in [8].
Future directions. There are several future directions for this line of work.
The first and perhaps the most important direction is on making the model and
its primitives easily usable by end users. This is paramount to the adoption of
the model. Mechanisms for making the model more usable may include design-
ing intuitive user-interfaces for visualizing, granting and revoking blessings, and
conventions on blessing names that help write intelligible access-control policies.
Another direction is that of enabling mutual privacy in the Vanadium au-
thentication protocol. Currently, the protocol involves the server presenting its
blessing before the client. While this is beneficial to the client, as it may choose to
not reveal its blessing after seeing the server’s blessing, it is disadvantageous to
the server. The server’s blessing is effectively revealed to anyone who connects
to it, including active network attackers. In fact, this lack of mutual privacy
is common to many other mutual authentication protocols (such as TLS [17],
SIGMA-I [15]) wherein one of the parties must reveal its identity first. In the sce-
narios considered in this work, the participants may be personal end-user devices
neither of which is inclined to reveal its identity before learning the identity of
its peer. In ongoing work [31], we are designing a private mutual authentication
protocol that allows each end to learn its peer’s blessing only if it satisfies the
peer’s authorization policy.
Finally, one may consider designing mechanisms for securely leveraging ex-
ternal cloud-based services when internet access is available. For instance, a
Cloud-based service may be used as a transparent proxy for RPCs, as a revo-
cation and auditing service for blessing delegations, or as a readonly backup for
data. In all cases, the goal would be to leverage external Cloud-based services
for various tasks while granting them the minimal authority necessary for the
task.
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